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ABSTRACT
The legal framework to fight and suppress piracy is embodied largely
in the United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea (“UNCLOS”), 1982,
which is supplemented by United Nations Security Council Resolutions,
and international conventions and treaties. This Article aims to critique the
existing legal framework against piracy and challenge its efficacy in
successfully curbing and eradicating piracy around the world throughout
history. Unlike the extensive literature on legal studies of piracy, this Article
recognizes piracy as a global menace, rather than observing it through the lens
of regional differences. Consequently, this Article seeks to identify creeks and
holes within the definitional and jurisdictional approach toward counterpiracy laws. The legal requirements under the UNCLOS definition of piracy,
such as the violence requirement, the private ends requirement, the private ship
requirement, the two-ship requirement, and the high seas requirement will
be comprehensively explored in this Article. These characteristics of the
definition of piracy will be examined as impediments to the enforcement of
counter-piracy laws. Likewise, in addition to the definitional approach, the
jurisdictional concerns that impair the execution of the counter-piracy legal
framework will be extensively discussed. Within this context, legislative
issues, law enforcement issues, and adjudicative concerns, with special
regard to particular matters of valid arrest requirements, TFG consent, and
human rights perspectives, will be scrutinized in depth as obstructions to
the prosecution of pirates and the enforcement of counter-piracy laws.
INTRODUCTION
Although piracy is an international menace, it is specifically associated
with the increased activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of
Aden, particularly during the first decade of this century.1 In contrast, the
combined efforts of the relevant regional authorities have successfully
curbed piracy incidents in Southeast Asia.2
Since the 1990s, pirates have increasingly ransomed ships and their crews
in territorial seas close in proximity to Somalia’s coasts and the Gulf of
Aden, while also looting assets and shipments.3 These pirates have, at

1. See U.N. OFF. DRUGS & CRIME, THE GLOBALIZATION OF CRIME: A TRANSNATIONAL
ORGANIZED CRIME THREAT ASSESSMENT, at 268, U.N. SALES NO. E.10.IV.6 (2010).
2. Tamara Renee Shie, Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia: The Evolution and
Progress of Intra-ASEAN Cooperation, in PIRACY, MARITIME TERRORISM AND SECURING
THE MALACCA STRAITS 163, 175–75 (Graham Gerard Ong-Webb ed., 2006).
3. See Melissa Simpson, An Islamic Solution to State Failure in Somalia?, in
TERRORISM IN AFRICA: THE EVOLVING FRONT IN THE WAR ON TERROR 9, 14 (John Davis
ed., LEXINGTON BOOKS, 2010).
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times, also claimed that they are defending Somalia’s interests through
piracy.4 This avowal holds some truth, since Somalia’s sea territory has
been used as a dumping ground for toxic waste and has been exploited by
foreign fisheries due to ineffective and impotent governmental control.5
Weak authoritative governance, the non-enforcement of laws, increasing
plunder, and internal political turmoil in Somalia have increased the numbers
of pirates and the occurrence of piracy in general.6 New recruits into these
armed groups have largely included fine fishermen, who are adept at sailing.7
This threat creates unnavigable regions, mainly in the “Suez Canal, [including
the] Gulf of Aden [and between the] Horn of [the] African Continent [and
the] Arabian Peninsula.”8 In fact, pirates have even gone far off the coasts
of Somalia to capture ships.9 This loot and unnavigable waters crawling with
parasitic pirates have made international shipping through these watercourses
nearly impossible,10 and has notoriously developed a category of humankind,
classified by the disparaging term “pirates.”11 This classification is comparable
to “terrorists,” which is used to classify particular human beings as a detestable
subspecies of mankind.12
In a number of instances, the Security Council (“SC”) has maintained
that pirates and piracy in general are a threat to international peace and
security.13 In its own words, the SC has stated that pirates and piracy
“exacerbate the situation in Somalia which continues to constitute a threat to
international peace and security in the region.”14 To reinforce that the
matter of piracy is not substantially resolved and continues to pose a great
threat to the global community, SC Resolution 1816 of 2008 added that:

4.
See Victoria Ellen Collins, Somali pirates: victims of perpetrators or both?, in
TOWARDS A VICTIMOLOGY OF STATE CRIME 66, 73 (Dawn L. Rothe & David Kauzlarich eds.,
2014).
5. See id. at 73–74.
6. JADE LINDLEY, SOMALI PIRACY: A CRIMINOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 48–50 (2016).
7. Tullio Treves, Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments off the
Coast of Somalia, 20 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 400, 400 (2009).
8. See id.
9. ANDREW PALMER, THE NEW PIRATES: MODERN GLOBAL PIRACY FROM SOMALIA TO
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 167 (2014).
10. See Treves, supra note 7, at 400.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. E.g., ROBIN GEISS & ANNA PETRIG, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AT SEA: THE
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR COUNTER-PIRACY OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA AND THE GULF OF ADEN
180 (2011); S.C. Res. 1816 (June 2, 2008).
14. E.g., GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 13; S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 13.
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[T]he long-term delay in the settlement of the Somali issue is posing a serious
threat to international peace and security, while the rampant piracy off the Somali
coast has worsened the security situation in Somalia.15

Accordingly, this Article explores whether the existing legal framework,
which seeks to suppress and fight piracy, is sufficient. This Article is
divided into three sections. Section I will address the international legal
framework to suppress piracy by first discussing the development of the
international conventions, treaties, and UNSC resolutions. Then, attention
will turn to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(“UNCLOS”) of 1982 and its leading role as a global instrument against
piracy. Section II.A. will discuss the definitional concerns of piracy as practical
impediments to the execution of counter-piracy laws. Five requirements
under the UNCLOS piracy definition will be considered, along with the
criticism it has received. Finally, Section III will inspect the jurisdictional
concerns in the prosecution of pirates and is divided into three subsections.
Section III.A. will deal with legislative issues. Section III.B. will cover law
enforcement issues, with special regard to the specific matters of valid arrest
requirements, TFG consent, and human rights perspectives. Finally, Section
III.C will address the adjudicative concerns over the enforcement of counterpiracy laws.
I. COUNTER-PIRACY INTERNATIONAL LAW
This section of the Article discusses international laws against piracy.
First, it starts with a brief anatomical development of counter-piracy
international laws. Then, it proceeds to explain the legal framework to curb
piracy under the UNCLOS. Within this context, the legal machinery to
fight terrorism is set out concisely to give a glimpse of the existing legal
framework to curb piracy, so that the later sections of this Article can build
upon the previously established legal notions.
In the initial stage of codifications regarding piracy, the preliminary
report against piracy was prepared by the League of Nations.16 But, because
Member States did not consider piracy a widespread problem, the report

15. Tullio Treves, Piracy and the international law of the sea, in MODERN PIRACY:
LEGAL CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES 117, 123–24 (Douglas Guilfoyle ed., 2013); Tullio
Treves & Cesare Pitea, Piracy, International Law and Human Rights, in THE FRONTIERS
OF HUMAN RIGHTS: EXTRATERRITORIAL AND ITS CHALLENGES 89, 91 (Nehal Bhuta ed.,
2016); see also S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 13.
16. See MD SAIFULLAH KARIM, MARITIME TERRORISM & THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL
INSTITUTIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 49 (Robin Churchill & Alex Oude
Elfernik eds., 2016); see Report to the Council of the League of Nations on the Questions
which Appear Ripe for International Regulation (1927) 22 AM. J. INT’L L. 4, 4–38 (Supp.
1928).
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did not receive the attention it needed.17 Later, in 1932, the Harvard Research
Draft introduced the first ever customary law against piracy, empowering
each state with jurisdiction to combat piracy.18 In 1958, the Geneva
Convention on the High Seas (“GCHS”) occurred and Articles 14–21 were
established.19 After, the Harvard Research Draft formed the foundations of the
International Law Commission’s work concerning piracy in the GCHS,20 and
subsequently, the UNCLOS codified eight provisions, Articles 100–107,
which relate to piracy.21 These articles mirrored Articles 14–21 of the GCHS.22
However, the UNCLOS does not cover the regulations suggested in a 1970
report by the International Law Association.23
In addition to the GCHS and the UNCLOS, there are two other areas of
international law that cover “piracy.” The Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation of 1988 (“SUA
Convention”) suppresses acts of piracy, but goes one step further than the
UNCLOS by including political offenses within the scope of piracy.24 The
SUA Convention has 166 parties as of 2017, but only sixteen ratifications.25

17. Vladimir Golitsyn, Maritime Security (Case Piracy), in 2 COEXISTENCE, COOPERATION
& SOLIDARITY 1157, 1159 (Holger P. Hestermeyer et al. eds., 2012).
18. See Eugene Kontorovich, Pirate ‘Gaobalisation’: Dividing Responsibility Among
States, Companies, and Criminals, in DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 386, 388 (André Nollkaemper et al. eds., 2015); see also Draft Convention on Piracy,
with Comment (1932), reprinted in 26 AM. J. INT’L L. 739, 743–48 (Supp. 1932).
19. See PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW 189 (7th rev. ed. 2002); see also Geneva Convention on the High Seas, arts. 14–21,
opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 11(entered into force Sept. 30, 1962).
20. PROF. K. R. SINGH, COASTAL SECURITY: MARITIME DIMENSIONS OF INDIA’S
HOMELAND SECURITY 66 (2012); see similarities between Draft Convention on Piracy,
with comment, supra note 18 and Geneva Convention on the High Seas, supra note 19.
21. JAMES KRASKA, CONTEMPORARY MARITIME PIRACY: INTERNATIONAL LAW,
STRATEGY & DIPLOMACY AT SEA 127 (2011); see U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea
art. 100-07, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov.
16, 1994).
22. SINGH, supra note 20; see Geneva Convention on the High Seas, supra note 19.
23. See SINGH, supra note 20, at 63–70; Compare U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea, supra note 21, with Int’l L. Ass’n Report on the Fifty-Fourth Hague Conference,
at 706–71 (1970).
24. Ke Xu, Piracy and Energy Security in Southeast Asian Waters, in ASIAN ENERGY
SECURITY: THE MARITIME DIMENSION 183, 197 (Hongyi Lai ed., 2009); see also Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation art. 3,
Mar. 10, 1988, 1687 U.N.T.S. 221[hereinafter SUA Convention].
25. See, Int’l Mar. Org., Statuses of Conventions, IMO.ORG (AUG. 11, 2017), http://
www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx [https://
perma.cc/5AEG-FA7R].
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Unlike the UNCLOS, it criminalizes other maritime offenses, such as
the presence of explosives or dangerous material that can destroy or harm
ships.26 It further allows searches of vessels or ships on reasonable grounds
of suspicion regarding performances of offenses enlisted under the SUA
Convention.27
The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed
Robbery against Ships in Asia of 2006 (“RECAAP”) curbs piracy in Asia.28
This convention only has a handful of ratifications and sixteen signatories,
due in part to it deliberately targeting only victim coastal states in Asia.29
This tool obliges Member States to employ their available resources to seize
pirate ships and to cooperate with other States with the best possible
approaches.30 More recently, UNSC resolutions such as Resolution 1897
(2009) and Resolution 1976 (2011) have respectively urged States to bring
their domestic laws into conformity with the UNCLOS to suppress piracy
and to prosecute pirates in an effort to enforce counter-piracy laws effectively.31
Finally, the remainder of this section discusses articles 100, 107, and
110 of the UNCLOS of 1982, also known as the Law of the Sea Convention
(“LOSC”).32 Almost all major States, 168 in total, are parties to the UNCLOS,
which is why the UNCLOS is the governing law against piracy globally.33
However, a few of the most influential states are not parties; the United
States of America, Iran, North Korea, the United Arab Emirates, and nine

26. James Kraska, America’s maritime challenges and priorities: The Asian dimension, in
MARITIME CHALLENGES & PRIORITIES IN ASIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY 239
(Joshua H. Ho & Sam Bateman eds., 2013); see also SUA Convention, supra note 24.
27. MD SAIFULLAH KARIM, supra note 16, at 62; see also SUA Convention, supra
note 24, at art. 8.
28. Nur Jale Ece, The Maritime Dimension of International Security: Piracy Attacks, in
MARITIME SECURITY AND DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM 11, 26 (F. Bora Uzer ed., 2012);
The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against
Ships in Asia (2006) [hereinafter RECAAP].
29. See Ece, supra note 28, at 26.
30. RAMSES AMER ET AL., THE SECURITY–DEVELOPMENT NEXUS: PEACE, CONFLICT
& DEVELOPMENT 70–71 (2013); see also RECAAP, supra note 28, at art. 2–3.
31. ANNA PETRIG, HUMAN RIGHTS & LAW ENFORCEMENT AT SEA: ARREST, DETENTION
& TRANSFER OF PIRACY SUSPECTS 29 (2014); see also S.C. Res. 1976, ¶ 13 (2011); S.C.
Res. 1897, ¶ 6 (2009).
32. Clive R. Symmons, Use of the Law of Piracy to Deal with Violent Inter-Vessel
Incidents at Sea beyond the 12-Mile Limit: The Irish Experience, in SELECTED CONTEMPORARY
ISSUES IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 169, 186 (Clive R. Symmons ed., 2011); see generally U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 21. The relevant articles of UNCLOS are
100–107 and 110, which address piracy. Id.
33. MD SAIFULLAH KARIM, supra note 16, at 160; to see the chronology of ratification
and detailed information regarding the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(1982), visit: http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm
[https://perma.cc/K4VT-8VGJ].
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other states are only signatories.34 Additionally, Israel, Turkey, Venezuela,
Syria, Peru, and ten other countries are neither parties nor signatories,35
though it is a distinction without any difference but in theory, as being a
signatory gives you a little additional power from being a concurring
party.36 Nevertheless, the wordings of the UNCLOS against piracy are an
exact reproduction of Articles 14–22 of the GCHS.37 Almost all States
that are not parties to the UNCLOS are parties to the GCHS,38 which is
why the rules and regulations set out in the UNCLOS remain governing
law.39 Furthermore, the legal framework against piracy in the UNCLOS
is in force, and it is deemed customary international law against states that
remain outside the scope of either convention, the UNCLOS or the GCHS.40
Thus, undeniably, the UNCLOS regulates the legal machinery against piracy
globally.41
Specifically, this Article will look specifically at Articles 100 through
106 of the UNCLOS in its analysis. First, Article 100 of the UNCLOS
mandates every Member State to cooperate with other nations to repress
piracy in the high seas, including all waters outside the internal waters of

34. HOUSE OF COMMONS FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, PIRACY OFF THE COAST OF
SOMALIA, 2011, HC 1318, at 86–87 (UK). To see the chronology of ratification and detailed
information regarding United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), visit:
http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm [https://
perma.cc/K4VT-8VGJ].
35. Id.
36. THOMAS F. KING, SAVING PLACES THAT MATTER: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE
NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION ACT 195 (2007).
37. PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW 189 (7th ed. 2002); Geneva Convention on the High Seas, supra note 19, at art. 14–
22.
38. To see the chronology of ratification and detailed information regarding the Geneva
Convention on the High Seas (1958), visit: http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/gclos/gclos.html [https://
perma.cc/EY5Z-VAGW].
39. Treves, Piracy, supra note 7, at 401.
40. Id.
41. See id.
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any sovereign state.42 Notably, Exclusive Economic Zones43 (“EEZs”)
are included in the high seas only for these purposes.44
Second, Article 101 defines piracy, charting various prerequisites and
criteria providing a complete analysis as to what constitutes piracy.45 The
definition of piracy and its characteristics, coupled with the criticism of
the limitations it offers, is expanded upon in the next section, but for the
purposes of this section, piracy under the UNCLOS includes illicit actions
committed by offenders in private vessels or ships against any ship or
vessel or property for private ends in the high seas.46 Additionally, voluntary
participation or intentional assistance of these activities is also considered
piracy.47
Third, Article 102 explains that, if pirates or offenders take over a
government ship or warship is taken over by pirates or offenders by harming
the original crew, the ship will be considered a pirate ship.48
Fourth, to resolve any confusion, Article 103 defines a pirate ship.49 In
a comprehensive explanation, it states that if the controlling agents of a
ship intend to carry out the offenses of piracy listed in Article 101, the
vessel or ship in question is said to be a pirate ship.50
Fifth, Article 104 delimits the retention or loss of nationality of a ship.
It sets forth that the nationality of a vessel may remain intact even after

42. Eric A. Heinze, A “Global War on Piracy?” International Law and the Use of
Force against Sea Pirates, in MARITIME PIRACY & THE CONSTRUCTION OF GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 47, 52 (Michael J. Struett et al. eds., 2013); see also U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 100.
43. An exclusive economic zone is the area beyond, but adjacent to territorial seas
and subject to the specific legal regime established in the UNCLOS. See U.N. Convention
on the Law of the Sea art. 55, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
(entered into force Nov. 16, 1994).
44. GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 13, at 65; see also U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 58, 100–01.
45. KRASKA supra note 21, at 128–32; see also U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea, supra note 21, at art. 101.
46. See KRASKA, supra note 21, at 128–32; see also U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 101.
47. NEIL BOISTER, AN INTRODUCTION TO TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 30 (2012);
see also KAMAL-DEEN ALI, MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE GULF OF GUINEA
117 (2015); see also U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 101.
48. International Maritime Organization Circular 3180, in 125 TERRORISM: COMMENTARY
ON SECURITY DOCUMENTS: PIRACY & INTERNATIONAL MARITIME SECURITY–DEVELOPMENTS
THROUGH 2011 483, 490 (Kristen E. Boon, Aziz Huq & Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. eds.,
2012); see also U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 102.
49. See GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 13, at 65; see also U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 103.
50. See GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 13, at 65; see also U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 103.
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the ship has transformed into a pirate ship.51 This Article further clarifies
that the principle of retention is dependent on the national laws of the
concerned ship or vessel, which will determine whether there is retention
or loss of nationality.52
Finally, Articles 105 and 106 relate to the arrest and seizure of pirates
and pirate ships,53 which is discussed in depth in Section III of this Article.
Article 105 provides universal jurisdiction to every state of the world,
stating every State can seize a pirate ship and arrest its crew members.54
It adds that the policing State is free to determine the sanctions, fines, or
retaliatory actions to be implemented against pirates and pirate ship.55
However, it also offers a particular regulation, holding special consideration
should also be given to safeguarding the rights of third parties involved in
good faith, such as the vendors of shipments.56 Article 106 offers protection
to the interests of neutral parties: if the policing State seizes a ship without
reasonable grounds, it shall be liable to pay for damage caused to a nonpirate ship.57
In conclusion, several international conventions have codified laws against
piracy;58 however, the UNCLOS is the governing law toward Member
States as a Convention, and toward non-Member States as customary
international law.59 In addition, certain UN resolutions play a beneficial

51. See KRASKA, supra note 21 at 131–32; see also U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 104.
52. See KRASKA, supra note 21 at 131–32; see also U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 104.
53. Robert C. Beckman, The piracy regime under UNCLOS: problems and prospects
for cooperation, in PIRACY AND INTERNATIONAL MARITIME CRIMES IN ASEAN: PROSPECTS
FOR COOPERATION 17, 26 (Robert C. Beckman & J. Ashley Roach eds., 2012); see U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 105–06.
54. See GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 13, at 65; see also U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 105.
55. See GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 13, at 65; see also U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 105.
56. See GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 13, at 65; see also U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 105.
57. See Beckman, supra note 53, at 26; see also U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea, supra note 21, at art. 106.
58. See generally U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 21; see Geneva
Convention on the High Seas, supra note 19; SUA Convention, supra note 24.
59. Robert Beckman, Jurisdiction over Pirates and Maritime Terrorists, in THE
LIMITS OF MARITIME JURISDICTION 349, 351 (Clive H. Schofield et al. eds., 2013).
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role in curbing piracy, such as UN Resolutions 1816 and 1851.60 The
UNCLOS mainly defines what piracy is,61 what kind of ships can be considered
pirate ships,62 when hijacked national ships can be retained, and the interests
of third parties.63 It also sets out regulations regarding the apprehension
of pirates and the seizure of pirate ships.64 These notions of piracy and
the arrest and seizure of pirates and pirate ships is discussed in Section III
in detail. The notion of hot pursuit against pirates and the role of UN resolutions
coupled with other jurisdictional issues involved in fighting piracy is also
discussed in Section III. Accordingly, Section II discusses definitional concerns
of piracy.
II. DEFINITIONAL CONCERNS
The primary question at issue in this section is what piracy is, and what
constitutes piracy within the defined limits within the legal framework of
international law. Article 101 of the UNCLOS defines piracy. It reads as
follows:
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or
the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and
directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or
against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place
outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a
ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a
pirate ship or aircraft;

60. DOUGLAS GUILFOYLE, SHIPPING INTERDICTION & THE LAW OF THE SEA 153
(2009); see also S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 13; S.C. Res. 1851 (Dec. 16, 2008).
61. BOISTER, supra note 47, at 30; see also U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea,
supra note 21, at art. 101.
62. GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 13, at 64–65; see also U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 104.
63. KRASKA, supra note 21, at 128–32; see also U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea, supra note 21, at art. 104.
64. See Beckman, supra note 53, at 26; see also U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea, supra note 21, at art. 105–06.
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(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act
described in subparagraph (a) or (b).65
The aspects and criteria within this UNCLOS definition can be divided
into five categories, referred to as Factors 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 in the following
discussion.
This section examines the requirements presented in the UNCLOS definition
of piracy. Five requirements—namely the violence, private ends, private
ship, two-ship, and high seas requirements—will be discussed in the course of
identifying the impediments to the execution of counter-piracy laws.66
Thereafter, criticism against the UNCLOS piracy definition will also be
briefly discussed.
A. Violence Requirement
Factor 1 suggests that, as a minimum, illicit activities of violence,
detention, or depredation must exist as a prerequisite to constitute piracy.
The use of the word “or” suggests that the activities of violence, detention,
and depredation can each dispositively establish an act of piracy.67 However,
these terms are not explained in any greater detail or specification.68
Nevertheless, academics have pointed out that these activities can be
targeted against personnel or property on board.69 Furthermore, it is also
evident that attempts to undertake such activities are not covered within
the ambit of this definition.70 Similarly, an important question is what happens
if piracy is committed without depredation, violence, or detention. This
remains unanswered. For example, what if the whole crew of a victim
ship becomes accomplices of the pirates and agreeably helps them in the
execution of their plan? Would it be considered piracy? In such a situation,
there are real pirates, who are lucratively looting the ship. So, while, arguably,

65. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 101; see also
KAMAL-DEEN ALI, supra note 47, at 117; see also KRASKA, supra note 21, at 128–32; see
also BOISTER, supra note 47, at 30.
66. BOISTER, supra note 47, at 30; see also U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea,
supra note 21, at art. 101 (for definitional requirements of piracy).
67. KAMAL-DEEN ALI, supra note 47, at 117; see also U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 101.
68. KRASKA, supra note 21, at 128–32; see also U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea,
supra note 21, at art. 101.
69. YOSHIFUMI TANAKA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 379 (2015).
70. See id. at 379–82.
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this scenario should be considered an act of piracy, it cannot be deemed
piracy under the UNCLOS.
B. Private Ends Requirement
Factor 2 of the UNCLOS definition requires that the illicit activities are
attributed towards personal or private gain.71 This means that in order to
bring any illegal activity within the definition of piracy, it must be committed
for personal or private gain.72 This factor is divided into two schools of
thought. The first suggests that illegal activities that are executed for
governmental, political, or insurgent motives do not constitute piracy, as
such activities are political in nature and have something to do with the
state.73 To this end, the intention of the accused determines whether an
act is one of piracy, which makes this ideology very subjective in practice.74
The other school of thought considers that “private ends” in the definition
includes all activities that are not endorsed by the state, so all activities
that are insurgent or political in nature are also covered.75 However, there
is an unsettling implication in this theory because all private ships with
mere imagined intentions would no longer fall within the definition of
piracy.76
This confusion is more eloquently clarified through the renowned
incident of the ship Santa Maria. In 1961, a political rebel named Captain
Galvão captured the Portuguese ship Santa Maria.77 It is important to
note that Captain Galvão and his other associates were passengers of the
Santa Maria, and they hijacked the ship for their own political interests.78
Captain Galvão claimed the insurgency was a stepping-stone toward
rebellion against the state.79 Portuguese authorities declared this activity
as piracy, but the accused sailed the ship to Brazil, where they were granted
political asylum.80 The Portuguese government did not endorse the hijacking
of the ship; rather, it was taken for private ends, as required by the definition

71. BOISTER, supra note 47, at 30; see also U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea,
supra note 21, at art. 101.
72. KAMAL-DEEN ALI, supra note 47, at 117 (BRILL, 2015); see also U.N. Convention
on the Law of the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 101.
73. See TANAKA, supra note 69, at 379–82.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. TOR SELLSTROM, SWEDEN AND NATIONAL LIBERATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA:
FORMATION OF A POPULAR OPINION [1950–1970] 392 (1999).
78. RUPERT HERBERT-BURNS, SAM BATEMAN, & PETER LEHR, LLOYD’S MIU HANDBOOK
OF MARITIME SECURITY 67 (2008).
79. See SELLSTROM, supra note 77, at 392–93.
80. See id.; see also HERBERT-BURNS, supra note 78, at 392–67.
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of piracy.81 Ultimately, the incident was not considered piracy, as the twoship requirement was not completed.82 However, academics such as Yoshifumi
Tanaka and Professor Brownlie have assessed this case and the motivations
of the offenders, explaining that material motives are defining facets
in establishing the offense of piracy, including the offenders’ inspirations
and the relationship of the offenders with the state and the victims in light
of political agendas.83 Through this, they believe that political and insurgent
behavioral activities cannot be considered acts of piracy.84 Of course, this
does not mean that offenders cannot be sanctioned for any offense at all,
since the debate specifically discusses piracy within the true confines of
the definition under Article 101 of the UNCLOS.85 It does, however, raise
an interesting debate about whether intentions or motivations of an offender
can deem a ship public in a true sense. In addition, contrary to this case,
the question is answered in the Sea Shepherd Case of 2013,86 which will
be discussed later in detail.
In another instance, the case of Castle John v. NV Babeco in 1986 raised
an issue about whether certain violent activities by environmental activists
can be considered piracy.87 In this case, Greenpeace associates captured
and damaged two Dutch ships that were polluting the seawater.88 In these
specific circumstances of these activities, the Cassation Court of Belgium
maintained that, since the actions of activists were committed for private
ends, the offenses came under the definition of piracy and, indeed, the
accused had committed piracy.89
Furthermore, in a similar and recent case in 2013 between the Institute
of Cetacean Research Group and the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society
81. TANAKA, supra note 69, at 379–82.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. KAMAL-DEEN ALI, supra note 47, at 117 (BRILL, 2015); see also the definition
of piracy in U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 101.
86. MONIKA AMBUS & RAMSES A. WESSEL, NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 201: PREDICTABILITY: TEMPORARINESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 377 (2015); see also
Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’y, 708 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir.
2013).
87. TANAKA, supra note 69, at 356; see also Castle John v. NV Babeco, 77 I.L.R.
537 [Cass.] [Court of Cassation], Dec. 19, 1986 (Belg.).
88. See TANAKA, supra note 69, at 356; see also Castle John v. NV Babeco, 77
I.L.R. 537 [Cass.] [Court of Cassation], Dec. 19, 1986 (Belg.).
89. See TANAKA, supra note 69, at 356; see also Castle John v. NV Babeco, 77
I.L.R. 537 [Cass.] [Court of Cassation], Dec. 19, 1986 (Belg.).
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that involved whale hunting, the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
lucidly defined the private ends aspect.90 The Sea Shepherd Conservation
Society members damaged the ships of a Japanese whale research group
in the name of conserving whales’ lives.91 In this case, the court defined
private ends as follows: “[P]rivate ends include those pursued on personal,
moral, or philosophical grounds, such as Sea Shepherd’s professed environmental
goals. That the perpetrators believe themselves to be serving the public
good does not render their ends public.”92 The court maintained that the
activists’ violent activities were the very embodiments of piracy.93 Despite
these respective cases in the national courts of two separate States,94 the
true meaning of the “private ends” as a requirement of constructing piracy95
remains open to interpretation by the international community. It is pertinent
to note that the outcomes of these cases oppose the rule established in the
Santa Maria case, where the mere intentions of the offenders were sufficient
to establish the pirate ship as a public vessel.96 Such conflicting principles
in case law construct a legal safe haven for pirates, allowing them to use
the existing legal framework to suit their own interests.
C. Private Ship Requirement
Moving on to Factor 3, this characteristic of the piracy definition states
that the presence of a private ship or aircraft and the offending personnel
is another prerequisite for piracy.97 Article 102 of the UNCLOS supplements

90. AMBUS & WESSEL, supra note 86, at 377; see also Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea
Shepherd Conservation Soc’y, 708 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2013).
91. CARLOS ESPOSITO ET AL., OCEAN LAW & POLICY: TWENTY YEARS OF DEVELOPMENT
UNDER THE UNCLOS REGIME 182 (2016); see also Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea
Shepherd Conservation Soc’y, 708 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir.2013).
92. Anthony Bergin, Southern Ocean Pirates: What’s in a name?, AUSTRALIAN
STRATEGIC POLICY INSTITUTE: THE STRATEGIST (Mar. 21, 2013), https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/
southern-ocean-pirates-whats-in-a-name/ [https://perma.cc/5TFJ-JNES]; see also Inst. of
Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’y, 708 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2013).
93. GERRY NAGTZAAM, FROM ENVIRONMENT ACTION TO ECOTERRORISM?: TOWARDS A
PROCESS THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL & ANIMAL RIGHTS ORIENTAL POLITICAL VIOLENCE
264 (EDWARD ELGAR PUB., 2017); see also Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd
Conservation Soc’y, 708 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2013).
94. See TANAKA, supra note 69, at 356; see also Castle John v. NV Babeco, Belgium
Court of Cassation, 77 I.L.R. 537 [Cass.] [Court of Cassation], Dec. 19, 1986) (Belg.); see
also Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’y, 708 F.3d 1099 (9th
Cir. 2013).
95. GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 13, at 62; see also the private ends requirement in
the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 101.
96. SELLSTROM, supra note 77, at 392; see also HERBERT-BURNS, supra note 78, at
67.
97. KRASKA, supra note 21, at 128–29; see also U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea, supra note 21, at art. 101.
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this factor by adding that if pirates take over warships or governmental
ships, such ships will no longer be deemed public, but categorically considered
a pirate ship.98 Similarly, Article 103 further untangles this issue by describing
the kind of ship that can commit piracy or be considered a pirate ship.99 It
additionally reminds that any ship that commits any of the offenses listed in
Article 101 will be considered a pirate ship.100 This explanation makes it
profoundly clear a hijacked ship can be considered a pirate ship in instances
where crews commit mutiny on state warships in order to use them against
victim ships.101 However, it still remains unclear whether hijacked ships
can commit piracy against themselves, when passengers hijack their own
ships. To clear this ambiguity, the UNCLOS established the two-ship rule.102
D. Two-Ships Requirement
Factor 4 requires a minimum of two vessels or ships to constitute
piracy—one ship or vessel is the offender; the other is the victim.103 For
this factor, a ship hijacked by its own crewmembers or passengers does
not constitute the offense of piracy.104 A case on point is the Achille Lauro
affair. In 1985, Palestinian activists boarded the Italian ship Achille Lauro
as passengers, later hijacked it, and demanded the release of certain
Palestinian prisoners.105 Since there was no pirate ship or any other vessel
involved, this was considered an offense of hijacking, not piracy.106 For
the same reason, the Santa Maria incident is also considered a hijacking

98. International Maritime Organization Circular 3180, supra note 48, at 490; see
also U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 102.
99. GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 13, at 62–65; U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea, supra note 21, at art. 103.
100. GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 13, at 62–65; see also U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea, supra note 21, at arts. 101, 103.
101. See GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 13, at 62–65; see also U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea, supra note 21, at arts. 101, 103.
102. KAMAL-DEEN ALI, supra note 47, at 117; U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea, supra note 21, at art. 101.
103. See KRASKA, supra note 21, at 129; see also U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 101.
104. TANAKA, supra note 69, at 379–82.
105. CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY: RULES
FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 138 (2005).
106. See id.
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rather than piracy.107 The requirement of two ships,108 and the Santa Maria
incident109 creates a gray area that pirates can exploit. The requirement of
two vessels or ships,110 and the exclusion of hijacking from the definition
of piracy, makes pirates more likely to start hijacking ships as passengers
when committing piracy to exploit the loophole. But, this exploitation is
reality is highly unlikely and improbable as such an act requires highly
organized pirates. Despite this, historical incidents of this sort have occurred,
such as an incident that took place near Canton in which pirates posed as
genuine passengers of a ship and boarded the ship with weapons.111
E. High Seas Requirement
Finally, Factor 5 maintains that piracy can only be committed on the high
seas. This means that piracy cannot be committed within the jurisdiction
of any country or state in its territorial waters.112 EEZs are not specifically
mentioned in the definition under Article 101,113 but the cross-reference
to EEZs in Article 58 of the UNCLOS confirms that acts of piracy can be
committed in the waters of EEZs.114
To cover territorial waters, the International Maritime Organization or
in the SUA Convention considers all activities committed within territorial
waters or internal waters are considered armed robberies or other offenses.
For instance, the IMO Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes
of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships of 2009 (“IMO Resolution”)
defines such offenses.115 It describes armed robberies against ships as follows:

107. See TANAKA, supra note 69, at 379–81.
108. See GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 13, at 62–65; see also U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 101, 103.
109. See SELLSTROM, supra note 77, at 392; see also HERBERT-BURNS, supra note
78, at 67.
110. See GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 13, at 62–65; see also U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 101.
111. HENRY SZE HANG CHOI, THE REMARKABLE HYBRID MARITIME WORLD OF HONG
KONG AND THE WEST RIVER REGION IN THE LATE QING PERIOD 206 (Gelina Harlaftis et al.
eds., 2017).
112. BOISTER, supra note 47, at 30; see also United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 101.
113. See KAMAL-DEEN ALI, supra note 47, at 117; see generally United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 101.
114. GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 13, at 64; see also U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea, supra note 21, arts. 58, 100–01.
115. Aref Fakhry, Piracy Across Maritime Law: Is There a Problem of Definition,
in THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING: INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES 106 (Aldo Chircop et al. eds., 2012); see also International Maritime
Organization [IMO] Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed
Robbery Against Ships, Res. A.1025(26), at ¶ 2 (Dec. 2, 2009).
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1. Any legal act of violence or detention or any act of piracy,
committed for private ends and directed against a ship or
against persons or property on board such a ship, within a
state’s internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial
sea;
2. Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act
described above.116
Article 101 of the UNCLOS, read alongside Article 105, makes the
commission of piracy offenses inside territorial borders impossible,117 and
the IMO Resolution stipulates that all piracy acts committed within territorial
waters are considered armed robberies or other defined offenses, such as
hijackings.118 It is understood that such activities that take place in territorial
waters of any State are to be dealt with by the forces and laws of that
State.119 For this reason, Somali pirates keep their activities around the
territorial waters of Somalia and, even if they practice piracy in the high
seas, they try to return to the territorial waters, which act as a safe zone,120
as law enforcement against Pirates is weak in Somalia.121 To counter this
backlash against the legal incompatibility between the sovereignty of Somalia
and counter-piracy laws, UN Resolution 1816, read with Resolution 1851,
allows forces to capture pirates in the territorial waters of Somalia, when
in hot pursuit and with the consent122 of the Somali authorities.123 Critics

116. JADE LINDLEY, SOMALI PIRACY: A CRIMINOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 94 (Ashgate,
2016); see also International Maritime Organization Res. A.1025(26), supra note 115, at
¶ 2 (2010).
117. GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 13, at 63; see also U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 101, 115.
118. See Fakhry, supra note 115, at 106; see also International Maritime Organization
Res. A.1025(26), supra note 115, ¶¶ 2, 7.
119. WINSTON C. EXTAVOUR, THE EXECUTIVE ECONOMIC ZONE; A STUDY OF THE
EVOLUTION & PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE Sea 18
(Institut Universitaire De Hautes Études Internationales, 1979).
120. HELMUT TUERK, REFLECTIONS ON THE CONTEMPORARY LAW ON THE SEA 90 (Vaughan
Lowe & Robin Churchill eds., 2012).
121. PETER T. LEESON, THE INVISIBLE HOOK: THE HIDDEN ECONOMICS OF PIRATES,
203 (2009).
122. Scholars argue that consent of ‘previous administration,’ known as TFG consent, is
a shaky ground to’generate legitimacy’ to intervene in the sovereign borders of a state.
TFG consent is discussed in detail in a later section of this Article. See infra Section III.B.2.
123. Andrew Erickson & Austin M. Strange, China’s Anti-Piracy Mission in the Gulf
of Aden: Implications for Anti-Piracy in the South China Sea, in NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY
ISSUES & THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: SHAPING A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR COOPERATION 172
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of the admissibility of hot pursuit in counter-piracy laws have argued that
such permissibility breaches Somalia’s sovereignty.124 They further back
their arguments with claims that such vast powers for the apprehension of
pirates are easily exploitable, since the law enforcement agencies of Somalia
are weak.125
F. Criticism of the UNCLOS Definition of Piracy
The first criticism against the definition of piracy under the UNCLOS
is in regards to the exclusion of hijacking by ships’ passengers within the
definition of piracy.126 A hijack by the passengers of a ship should be
considered piracy. In this context, the Achille Lauro incident is often cited
to for illustration.127 Similarly, the SUA Convention also does not cover
this aspect of the piracy definition; this instrument is another convention
that is widely accepted by the international community, with 166 parties
as of 2017.128
The second criticism against the UNCLOS definition of piracy is that it
excludes acts of violence with political motivations, such as insurgent acts
against governments.129 The wording of Article 101 and its concentration
on the term “private ends” is very vague and is still open for interpretation
by the international community.130 However, the SUA Convention fills
the gap and covers all crimes or offenses committed with political motivations.131
The third criticism against the UNCLOS definition is that piracy is limited
to the high seas, although EEZs are exceptionally included in this jurisdictional
layout. Critics claim that outside forces must also be allowed in the territorial
(Shicun Wu & Keyuan Zou eds., 2014); see also S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 13, at ¶¶ 3, 5,
7; see also S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 60, at ¶¶ 2, 3, 6.
124. See GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 13, at 84–85.
125. See id.
126. Robin Churchill, The Piracy Provisions of the UN convention on the Law of the
Sea – Fit for Purpose?, in THE LAW & PRACTICE OF PIRACY AT SEA: EUROPEAN & INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 21–23 (Panos Koutrakos & Achilles Skordas eds., 2014).
127. GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 13, at 41–43.
128. See GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 13, at 41–43; see also IMO STATUSES OF CONVENTIONS,
http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx (last
visited August 1, 2017) [https://perma.cc/Z4H3-4ACW].
129. See GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 13, at 61.
130. Agustin Blanco-Bazán, Suppressing Unlawful Acts: IMO Incursion in the Field
of Criminal Law, in THE LAW OF THE SEA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & SETTLEMENT OF
DISPUTES: LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE THOMAS A. MENSAH 721 (Tafsir Malick Ndiaye &
Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 2007); see also U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note
21, at art. 101.
131. See James Kraska, America’s Maritime Challenges and Priorities: The Asian
Dimension, in MARITIME CHALLENGES & PRIORITIES IN ASIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL
SECURITY 239 (Joshua H. Ho & Sam Bateman eds., 2013); see also SUA Convention,
supra note 24.

112

QURESHI (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 19: 95, 2017]

2/27/2018 10:42 AM

The Prosecution of Pirates
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.

seawaters of Somalia to curb piracy.132 In this regard, the United Nations
has allowed all States to use force against pirates in the territorial waters
of Somalia, specifically when in hot pursuit, in order to suppress piracy.133
Notably, piracy under the UNCLOS is said to include violence or acts
involving detention or any kind of depredation by people with one private
(pirate) ship against another (victim) ship in the high seas.134 Any kind of
involvement in the form of facilitation of piracy is also considered an act
of piracy.135 There are in total five requirements within the UNCLOS’s
definition of piracy: two-ship, private ends, high seas, private ship, and
violence rules.136 These characteristics are discussed in detail above.
Each factor creates some complications and poses an impediment to
curbing piracy. The requirement for violence or any kind of depredation
or detention makes it impossible to establish piracy when the crewmembers
of a ship are accomplices of pirates. Similarly, the two-ship and private ship
requirements exclude hijacking from piracy137 and create a significant
loophole that pirates can exploit. Lastly, the high seas requirement excludes
all piracy acts in the internal waters138 providing a legal safe haven for
pirates to escape to in the internal waters of Somalia. Critics of this argument
have suggested that through UN Resolutions 1816 and 1851, the seizure
and arrest of pirates in the territorial waters of Somalia is possible.139
Nevertheless, it is pivotal to examine here that such empowerment is
only acceptable against sovereign maritime territories of Somalia.140 Since
resolution 1851 does not create new jurisdictional basis in excess of Chapter
VII of the U.N charter regarding use of force; therefore it is rudimentarily

132. See GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 13, at 41–43.
133. Erickson & Strange, supra note 123, at 164; see also S.C. Res. 1816, supra note
13, ¶¶ 3, 5, 7; see also S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 60, ¶¶ 2, 3, 6.
134. NEIL BOISTER, supra note 47, at 30; see also U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 101.
135. KAMAL-DEEN ALI, supra note 47, at 117; see also U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 101.
136. KRASKA, supra note 21, at 128–32; see also U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea, supra note 21, at art. 101.
137. TANAKA, supra note 69, at 379–82.
138. GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 13, at 63–64; see also U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 101.
139. See TANAKA, supra note 69, at 379–82; see also S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 13,
¶¶ 3, 5, 7; see also S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 60, ¶¶ 2, 3, 6.
140. DONALD ROTHWELL ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES & MATERIALS WITH
AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVES 648 (2014).
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unnecessary.141 States fear that this imbalance in the counter piracy laws
injures national interests and sovereignty of states.142 To avoid allegations
of breaching the sovereignty of Somalia, the UNGA 1816—to use force
in the internal waters of Somalia—was passed with the consent of Transitional
Federal Government of Somalia (“TFG”).143
Accordingly, jurisdictional issues regarding using force to seize and
arrest pirate ships and pirates, coupled with TFG consent, is explored in
Section III, which also address the jurisdictional issues created by enforcement
of counter-piracy laws.
III. JURISDICTIONAL CONCERNS
In addition to definitional impediments to the enforcement of counterpiracy laws, this section will also discuss jurisdictional concerns. It is
recognized that the UNCLOS provides universal jurisdiction for the
enforcement of its regulations against piracy in the high seas.144 Similarly,
the GCHS also incorporates jurisdictional issues regarding piracy.145
However, both conventions significantly lack detail on the enforcement
of piracy laws.146 For this reason, this section deals with the jurisdictional
and enforcement issues pertaining to piracy. This section is divided into
three subsections. Section III.A. addresses legislative issues; Section III.B.
covers law enforcement issues with special regard to the specific requirements
for valid arrest, TFG consent, and the human rights perspective; and
Section III.C. covers adjudicative concerns over the enforcement of counterpiracy laws.

141. Efthymios Papastavridis, Piracy off Somalia: The ‘Emperors and the Thieves of
the Oceans’ in the 21st Century, in PROTECTING HUMAN SECURITY IN AFRICA 138 (Ademola
Abbas ed., 2010); see also S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 13, ¶¶ 3, 5, 7; see also S.C. Res.
1851, supra note 60, ¶¶ 2, 3, 6.
142. TUERK, supra note 120, at 92.
143. Clive Schofield & Robin Warner, Horn of Troubles: Understanding and Addressing
the Somali “Piracy” Phenomenon, in DEEP CURRENTS AND RISING TIDES: THE INDIAN
OCEAN AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 58 (John Garofano & Andrea J. Dew eds., 2013).
144. GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 13, at 64–65; see also U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 105.
145. SINGH, supra note 20, at 63–70; see also Geneva Convention on the High Seas,
supra note 19, at art. 14–21.
146. See generally U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 21; Geneva
Convention on the High Seas, supra note 19. Additionally, see TUERK, supra note 120, at
75, 84 and Herbert Miehsler, Customs Frontier, in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 110 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1985).

114

QURESHI (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 19: 95, 2017]

2/27/2018 10:42 AM

The Prosecution of Pirates
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.

A. Legislative Issues
It is not surprising that the GCHS has not incorporated a legislative
requirement for all states to set out national or domestic laws to suppress
piracy.147 But this gap can be explained by the date of the GCHS. The
GCHS convened long before piracy became a global issue.148 However, the
UNCLOS and the SUA Convention also do not have a legislative requirement
in their legal framework.149 While the UN was drafting the UNCLOS,
certain UN Conventions came into force that detailed transnational crimes,150
such as the Convention on the Prevention & Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents of 1977.151
Such instruments obliged Member States to legislatively criminalize offenses
listed in the convention, and to penalize offenders heavily with penalties
and punishments.152
This exclusion from the legislation in the UNCLOS and the SUA
Convention reflects the general opinion of the UNCLOS’s signatories to
enact a reproduction of the GCHS regulations. It is also possible that the
drafters did not intend to incorporate a legislative requirement. As the
UNCLOS does not oblige States to legislate against piracy, most of the
parties to the UNCLOS have not incorporated the legal framework of the
UNCLOS into their domestic laws.153 In turn, the United Nations General
Assembly, the SC, and the IMO have been pressing States to incorporate
piracy in their respective legislations.154 Incorporation of the UNCLOS

147. See Miehsler, supra note 146, at 11; see also Geneva Convention on the High Seas,
supra note 19.
148. The Geneva Convention on the High Seas was convened in 1958, whereas piracy
became a global concern in the 1990s. See Melissa Simpson, An Islamic Solution to State
Failure in Somalia?, in TERRORISM IN AFRICA: THE EVOLVING FRONT IN THE WAR ON TERROR
14 (John Davis ed., 2010).
149. TUERK, supra note 120, at 118. See also SUA Convention, supra note 24; Miehsler,
supra note 146, at 11. See generally U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 21.
150. Churchill, supra note 126, at 23.
151. MYRA WILLIAMSON, TERRORISM, WAR & INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGALITY OF
THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST AFGHANISTAN IN 2001 53 (2016). See also The Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, including
Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167.
152. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 151, at 53; see also The Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, supra note 151.
153. See TUERK, supra note 120, at 75, 84.
154. Int’l Maritime Organization Res. A.1025(26), supra note 115. See also Int’l
Maritime Organization [IMO], Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Waters Off
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regulations into domestic legislation is imperative because States cannot
prosecute arrested pirates without national laws in their courts. On the basis
of the universal jurisdiction granted by the UNCLOS alone is insufficient.155
Some scholars, such as Professor Robin Churchill, argue that the
requirement of cooperation under the UNCLOS among Member States
also encompasses the requirement to enact laws to suppress piracy within
the existing legal framework.156 Article 100 of the UNCLOS obliges Member
States to cooperate with each other to suppress piracy.157 But, on the other
hand, Professor Churchill has also added that such inclusion is merely theoretical
and debatable, which a view only expressed by handful of writers.158
B. Law Enforcement Issues
In regard to the jurisdictions of counter-piracy laws, the UNCLOS offers
universal jurisdiction to every state.159 This means that any state can seize
a pirate ship or any ship hijacked by pirates on reasonable grounds of
suspicion.160 The UNCLOS adds that States can arrest pirates and seize
property from the ship in all seawaters, except territorial ones.161 The
universal jurisdiction to arrest or seize ships for piracy reasons is the only
exception to the rule that a flagged ship can only be arrested by its own
state.162 In addition to the powers granted by Article 105, Article 110 of
the UNCLOS empowers warships to visit and seize pirate ships, so long
as they have reasonable grounds to believe the concerned ship is committing
piracy within the scope of Article 101.163
the Coast of Somalia, Res. A.1044(27) (Nov. 30, 2011); G.A. Res. 65/37 (Dec. 7, 2010);
S.C. Res. 1918 (Apr. 27, 2010); S.C. Res. 2018 (Oct. 31, 2011).
155. Churchill, supra note 126, at 24.
156. Id.
157. Heinze, supra note 42, at 52; see also U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea,
supra note 21, at art. 100.
158. See Churchill, supra note 126, at 24.
159. GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 13, at 64–65; see also U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 105.
160. See GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 13, at 63; see also U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 105.
161. See GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 13, at 65; see also U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 105. Article 19 of the Geneva Convention on the High
Seas (1958) is identical to Article 105 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (1982). Geneva Convention on the High Seas, supra note 19, at art. 19; United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 105.
162. CRAIG H. ALLEN, MARITIME COUNTERPROLIFERATION OPERATIONS AND THE
RULE OF LAW 119 (2007); see also U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 21,
at art. 92.
163. GUILFOYLE, supra note 60, at 23–24; United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 101, 105, 110; see also John A. Wajilda, An Overview of the
Economic Implications of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Nigeria, in PIRACY
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1. Requirements to Make a Valid Arrest
Three requirements of the UNCLOS must be met to make a lawful arrest
within the existing legal framework against piracy—named A, B, and C
for the purposes of this article. These requirements are accompanied by
international laws. Requirement A makes it mandatory that the arrest
be made by a governmental, authorized, flagged warship or any ship of a
state.164 As a reasonable exception to this requirement, Article 19 of the
GCHS states that a victim ship can also overpower an offending ship in
self-defense and can successfully arrest the pirates and then deliver them
to an authorized ship or the relevant forces of any coastal state.165
Requirement B obliges the policing ship to make an arrest only after it
is satisfied that reasonable grounds exist the other ship is a pirate ship.166
This requirement is not explicitly mentioned in the UNCLOS or the GCHS,
but is implicitly incorporated in the legal framework.167 Article 106 of the
UNCLOS and Article 20 of the GCHS make it clear that the policing state
is liable to pay damages if it seizes a ship without adequate grounds.168
The wording of “without adequate grounds” means that the arrest must
only be made after acquiring a reasonable belief that the other ship is a pirate
ship.169 Requirement B is reasonable because empowering every state to
arrest or seize any ship without reasonable grounds that the other ship is a
pirate ship will over-empower the states, which would only result in chaos.
In addition to Article 120 of the UNCLOS, Article 110 also explicitly mentions
AT SEA, 114–115 (Maximo Q. Mejia Jr. et al. eds., 2013); ANNA PETRIG, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AT SEA: ARREST, DETENTION AND TRANSFER OF PIRACY SUSPECTS
223–25 (2014). See generally Douglas Guilfoyle, Jurisdiction at Sea, in HUMAN RIGHTS
AND THE DARK SIDE OF GLOBALISATION 114–15 (Thomas Gammeltoft Hansen & Jens V.

Hansen eds., 2016); Hans F.R. Boddens Hosang, Personal Self-Defence and its Relationship to
Rules of Engagement, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MILITARY
OPERATIONS 434 (Terry D. Gill & Dieter Fleck eds., 2015).
164. GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 13, at 92–93; see also U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 107.
165. L.F.E. Goldie, 1937 Geneva Agreement Supplementary to the Nyon Arrangement,
in THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE: A COLLECTION OF AGREEMENTS & DOCUMENTS WITH
COMMENTARIES 501 (Natalino Ronzitti ed., 1988); see also Geneva Convention on the
High Seas, supra note 19, at art. 19.
166. GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 13, at 56.
167. See id.
168. Beckman, supra note 53, at 26; see U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra
note 21, at art. 106; see also Geneva Convention on the High Seas, supra note 19, at art.
20.
169. Churchill, supra note 126, at 25.
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that a warship requires “reasonable grounds” to arrest or seize pirates and
pirate ships.170
Finally requirement C requires the arrest be made in the high seas, outside
the territorial waters of any state.171 As discussed above, EEZs are included
in the high seas for the purposes of suppressing or fighting piracy.172
2. TFG Consent
In addition to requirements A, B, and C, TFG consent is another key
factor that plays a vital role in determining the legality of making valid
arrests, specifically in the territorial waters of Somalia.173 The notion of
TFG consent has been briefly discussed already in this article—the UNSC
resolution has made Somali territorial waters an exception to the rule that
arrests and seizures can only be made on the high seas.174 In other words,
this means that the territorial waters of Somalia can be used to arrest and
seize pirates and pirate ships, since the TFG itself has consented to this
proposition to suppress piracy.175 The TFG explicitly granted consent to use
force or enter the territorial waters of Somalia to skirt any allegations of
breaching the sovereignty of Somalia.176 In its own words, the TFG has
communicated to the UN General Assembly that vessels may:
Enter the territorial waters of Somalia for the purposes of repressing
acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, in a manner consistent with such
action permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy under relevant
international law; and use, within the territorial waters of Somalia, in a
manner consistent with action permitted on the high seas with respect to
piracy under relevant international law, all necessary means to repress acts
of piracy and armed robbery.177

170. Wajilda, supra note 163, at 114–15; see also GUILFOYLE, supra note 163, at
114–15; see U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 110.
171. Beckman, supra note 53, at 26; see also U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea, supra note 21, at art. 105.
172. GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 13, at 64–65; see also U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea supra note 21, at art. 58, 101.
173. Treves, supra note 15, at 47; see also S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 13.
174. Beckman, supra note 53, at 21; see also S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 13; see also
S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 60.
175. Erickson & Strange, supra note 123, at 164; see also S.C. Res. 1816, supra note
13.
176. Schofield & Warner, supra note 143, at 58.
177. See S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 13, ¶ 7.
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This exception was originally meant to be temporary for a period of six
months.178 However, the timescale has been repeatedly extended.179 Moreover,
the exception comes with various conditions. For example, this resolution
is specifically against the territorial waters of Somalia, so it is not customary
international law that can be used against piracy against in different states.180
Simple SC authorization would have also sufficed to validate the counterpiracy exercises, but the Somali state’s consent was acquired to ensure that
the sovereignty of Somalia is not breached.181 This argument is supplemented
by the fact that the limits of territorial waters of Somalia are disputed, such
that they are claimed far more extensively than the prescribed limits under
the UNCLOS.182 The UNCLOS only allows states to mark a twelve milewide limit of territorial waters, which usually corresponds with the natural
watermark of a coast,183 and it allows a 200 mile-wide EEZ limit.184 Conversely,
Somalia has marked 200 mile-wide markings for its territorial waters.185
It is pertinent that the same region, which is in essence the EEZ of Somalia,
has been overwhelmingly exploited by other states, and Somali law enforcement
agencies are incapable of defending the country’s interests.186 In practice,
other countries routinely use these contested waters for their own interests.187
Thus, the SC has requested that Somalia demarcate its territorial waters in
accordance with the provisions of the UNCLOS.188
Professor Achilles Skordas has a unique set of theories in regard to TFG
consent.189 He believes that, the TFG cannot be considered legal authority
178. David Attard & Patricia Mallia, The High Seas, in 1 THE IMLI MANUAL ON
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME LAW: THE LAW OF THE SEA 271 (Attard et al. eds., 2014)
[hereinafter Attard et al.].
179. See id.
180. Beckman, Jurisdiction, supra note 53, at 21; see S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 13.
181. Efthymios Papastavridis, supra note 141, at 138.
182. GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 13, at 70.
183. FRANCES L. EDWARDS & DANIEL C. GOODRICH, INTRODUCTION TO TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY 246 (2013); see also U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 21, at
art. 3.
184. See EDWARDS & GOODRICH, supra note at 183; see also U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 57.
185. See GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 13, at 70.
186. Collins, supra note 4, at 73.
187. Id.
188. Robin Churchill, The Persisting Problem of Non-compliance with the Law of
the Sea Convention: Disorder in the Oceans, in THE 1982 LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION
AT 30: SUCCESSES, CHALLENGES AND NEW AGENDAS 144 (David Freestone ed., 2012); see
also S.C. Res. 1976, supra note 31.
189. Churchill, supra note 126, at 307–08.
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that grants consent on behalf of the Somali state, and the TFG can only be
considered a legitimate government under the international legal framework
because it is the governing body of Somalia.190 He supports his argument
with the accusation of the Monitoring Group of Somalia, the Libyan crisis,
and the official Stance of the United States and the United Kingdom.191
He adds that the use of force in territorial waters with the consent of the
TFG and the existence of piracy are two “shaky grounds” that do not “generate
legitimacy” to intervene within the sovereign borders of a state.192
3. Human Rights Perspective
Apart from counter-piracy laws, customary international law obligates
policing vessels to try and capture, seize, or arrest pirate ships or their crew,
using the minimum level force required to ensure the accomplishment of
the intended objective.193 Furthermore, where the use of force is inevitable,
force must not exceed the reasonable, necessary, and proportional limits
under customary international law.194 Policing vessels that intend to make
an arrest or seizure of a pirate vessel must respect humanitarian law, such
as a person’s rights to liberty and right to be told about the reasons of his
or her arrest.195 In the notable case Medvedyev v. France in 2010, the European
Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) maintained that the human rights enshrined
in the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) in 1950, are applicable
in the high seas.196 The Grand Chamber made direct reference to pirate
ships, ruling that ships can be arrested in the seas because the fight against
piracy enjoys universal jurisdiction.197 Similarly, in another case involving
Somali pirates known as the Cygnus case of 2010, the Rotterdam District
Court found that the failure to produce pirates in court within forty days
violated Article 5(3) of the ECHR.198

190. See id. at 308.
191. See id. at 307–08.
192. See id. at 308.
193. See id. at 26–27.
194. See id.
195. PETRIG, supra note 31, at 262; for reference to the human rights referred to, see
generally European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter
ECHR].
196. Medvedyev v. France, App. No. 3394/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010).
197. See id. ¶ 85, at 28.
198. Rb. Rotterdam 17 juni 2010, LJN BM8116, at 6 (Neth.); see also ECHR, supra
note 195, at art. 5.
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C. Adjudicative Issues
Similar to the universal jurisdiction of arresting and seizing pirates and
pirate ships, the adjudicative jurisdiction under conventions is universal,199
and is implicitly provided in Article 105 of the UNCLOS as follows:
The courts of the state which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties
to be imposed, and may also determine the action to be taken with regard to the
ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith.200

Article 105 and the empowerment to try pirates has divided scholars into
two groups. One group argues that only the state that has arrested the pirates
can try the accused pirates; meanwhile, the other believes that while only
the arresting state can try the accused pirates, this does not bar them from
transferring or extraditing them to other states, as provided for by general
customary practice in the international community.201 Western States have
entered into agreements with States such as Kenya, Mauritius, and the
Seychelles to transfer and extradite pirates to and for trial in Western courts.202
In this regard, the UNSC has encouraged states to form agreements to curb
adjudicative and jurisdictional issues to fight piracy.203 Similarly, IMO
Resolution 1025 (2010)204 and UNSC Resolution 1976 (2011)205 explicitly
mention this propositional stance. Furthermore, nearly all States have agreed
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)
in 1976 and the ECHR in 1950206 not to transfer or extradite pirates to

199. GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 13, at 64–65; see also U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 105.
200. See GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 13, at 65; see also U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 105.
201. See Churchill, supra note 126, at 28.
202. See id. at 28–30.
203. RICHARD WEITZ, WAR & GOVERNANCE: INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IN A CHANGING
WORLD ORDER 151 (2011); see also S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 60; see also S.C. Res. 1897,
supra note 31, ¶ 3.
204. MYRON H. NORDQUIST & NORTON MOORE, THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION:
US ACCESSION & GLOBALIZATION, 563 (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 2012); see also
International Maritime Organization Res. A.1025, supra note 115, ¶ 3.
205. PETRIG, supra note 31, at 29; see also Para 20, S.C. Res. 1976, supra note 31, ¶ 20.
206. See PETRIG, supra note 31, at 260–64; see also International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Part 3, Article 6, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR];
see also ECHR, supra note 195, Article 3 and Protocol No. 6 Article 1, at 6, 38.
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States where accused pirates are subject to practices of torture or the death
penalty.207
Another primary question regarding adjudicative concerns is whether
the UNCLOS requires States that have custody of pirates to prosecute
them. Article 105 of the UNCLOS uses the word “may,” which suggests
that the UNCLOS does not requires States to do so.208 Nevertheless, scholars
around the world contend that the duty to suppress piracy under Article
100 includes an obligation to prosecute arrested pirates.209 On the other
hand, it is possible that the interpretation by scholars of Article 100 is
beyond the intended or customary scope, because in practice most arrested
pirates are released without being brought to trial.210 Correspondingly,
the UNSC has repeatedly lamented the practice of not bringing pirates to
justice.211
However, this practice is not a result of States with custody of pirates
being sympathetic to them. Rather, it is because most of the states that have
successfully apprehended pirates do not have appropriate legislation to
criminalize piracy.212 For this reason, the procedure of prosecuting pirates
poses a legal obstacle for States, and releasing them without trial is just
simpler than confronting piracy and enacting legislation.213 The proposition
that there is no obligation for states to extradite or prosecute pirates under
the LOSC is refuted by other treaties, conventions, and agreements among
coastal states to suppress piracy—as briefly discussed previously. These
regulations of obligation are collectively known as dedere, aut judicare
and include Article 7 of the Hague Convention, Article 7 of the Montreal
Convention, Article 8 of the Hostages Convention, and Article 10 of the
SUA Convention.214 Furthermore, UNSC resolutions such as Resolution
207. There is no explicit obligation under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights to such effect. However general comment number 20 against Article 7 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides an implicit relationship. On the other
hand, the European Convention on Human Rights provides explicit reference to the
aforementioned propositions under Protocols 6 and 13. Moreover, the relationship with
pirates’ extradition under ECHR is implicitly maintained.
208. GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 13, at 64–65; see also U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea, supra note 21, at art. 105.
209. See GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 13, at 152.
210. PETRIG, supra note 31, at 34.
211. WENDY LAVERICK, GLOBAL INJUSTICE & CRIME CONTROL 41, 49, 50 & 54 (2016);
see also S.C. Res. 2020, at 1, 3 (Nov. 22, 2011); see also S.C. Res. 2077, at 1, 3 (Nov. 21,
2012).
212. See Beckman, supra note 59, at 355.
213. See id. at 354–57.
214. See Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft art.
7, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; see also Montreal Convention (formerly
Convention for The Unification of Certain Rules For International Carriage By Air) art. 7,
May 9, 1999, 2242 U.N.T.S. 309; see also International Convention Against the Taking
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1976 of 2011 and 1897 of 2009 have respectively urged states to bring
their domestic laws into conformity with the UNCLOS to suppress piracy
and to prosecute pirates to enforce counter-piracy laws effectively.215
The number of prosecutions and convictions of pirates is very low
compared to the number of incidents of piracy reported and to the numbers
of pirates apprehended.216 A research study found that in a time span of
eleven years, from 1998 to 2009, a total of 1,158 incidents of piracy were
reported, but only seventeen were prosecuted.217 These statistics were based
on the universal jurisdiction of piracy, since the policing states lacked
domestic laws to prosecute pirates.218 Similarly, a report of the SC found
that in a time span of five years, from 2006 to 2011, out of 1,063 prosecution
cases, only 612 pirates were successfully convicted.219
Professor Robin Churchill identified the reasons for this dramatic variability
in the numbers of instances in prosecutions versus apprehensions and
persecution versus convictions.220 He writes that the low numbers of
apprehensions are related to the cost of locating and apprehending pirates
in the high seas; this cost is further increased with the additional costs of
prosecuting and imprisoning pirates.221 So, without significant personal
interest, that is, when the stakes are concerned with personal equity, policing
states are not interested in incurring the costs related to the suppression of
piracy.222

of Hostages art. 8, Dec. 17, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205; see also SUA Convention, supra
note 24.
215. ANNA PETRIG, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AT SEA: ARREST,
DETENTION AND TRANSFER OF PIRACY SUSPECTS 25 (Gudmundur Alfredson, ed., 2014);
see also S.C. Res. 1976 supra note 31, ¶ 13; see also S.C. Res. 1897 ¶ 6 (Nov. 30, 2009).
216. Eugene Kontorovich & Steven Art, An Empirical Examination of Universal
Jurisdiction for Piracy, 104(3) AM. J. INT’L L. 436, 449–50 (2010).
217. Churchill, supra note 126, at 30.
218. See Kontorovich & Art, supra note 216, at 244; see also Churchill, supra note
126, at 30.
219. Melanie O’Brein, Where Security Meets Justice: Prosecuting Maritime Piracy
in the International Criminal Court, 4 ASIAN J. INT’L L. 81, 85 (2014).
220. See Churchill, supra note 126, at 30.
221. See id.
222. See Kontorovich & Art, supra note 216; see also Churchill, supra note 126, at
29–32.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The primary question that this article asked is whether the existing legal
framework to suppress and fight piracy is sufficient. Upon thorough
examination of the international laws to suppress piracy, it may be concluded
that the current framework is ineffective. The strict definitional requirements
under the legal framework of the UNCLOS fail to ensure the enforcement
of counter-piracy laws.223 For example, the two-ship requirement, the
exclusion of politically motivated or terrorist activities from piracy, the
exclusion of territorial waters, the private ship requirement, and the violence
requirement all place hindrances to the practical execution of counterpiracy laws.224 Nevertheless, these limitations are not the only restraints
against execution of anti-piracy laws. For instance, most piracy offenses
include violence and involve two ships,225 and where only one ship is involved
and passengers of ship hijack the ship, piracy falls within the scope of the
SUA Convention.226 But the SUA Convention, unlike the UNCLOS, does
not offer universal jurisdiction to every state in regard to enforcing
counter-piracy laws.227 Therefore, there is a need to expand the definition
of piracy under the UNCLOS to include offenses of piracy involving only
one ship.228 Similarly, the private ends requirement excludes politically
motivated or terrorist activities from the definition of piracy.229 The scope
of the UNCLOS’s piracy definition must also be extended to amend the
loophole within the legal framework, which allows the exploitation of laws
by pirates, since the intentions of offenders are subjective in the determination
of whether the event is occasioned for private ends.230 The territorial requirement
on the other hand must not be increased to include the territorial waters of
coastal states, since the SUA Convention covers nearly all offenses of violence
within territorial waters, such as armed robberies and other offenses enlisted

223.
224.

PAUL TODD, MARITIME FRAUD & PIRACY 6 (2013).
Kristen Boon, Commentary to 125 TERRORISM: COMMENTARY ON SECURITY
DOCUMENTS: PIRACY & INTERNATIONAL MARITIME SECURITY–DEVELOPMENTS THROUGH
2011 5–6 (Kristin E. Boon, Aziz Huq & Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. eds., 2012).
225. GUILFOYLE, supra note 60, at 125.
226. SUK KYOON KIM, MARITIME DISPUTES IN NORTHEAST ASIA: REGIONAL CHALLENGES
AND COOPERATION 154 (2017).
227. Sandra L. Hodgkinson, The Governing International Law on Maritime Piracy,
in PROSECUTING MARITIME PIRACY: DOMESTIC SOLUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 26
(Michael P. Scharf, Michael A. Newton, & Milena Sterio eds., 2015).
228. See Hodgkinson, supra note 227, at 22–26, to understand reasons of including
hijacking under the UNCLOS definition.
229. SEDAT LACINER & IHSAN BAL, USAK YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
& LAW 234 (2011).
230. See id. (The author argues that the UNCLOS definition and its requirement of
private ends must be expanded to include politically motivated or terrorist activities.).
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under it.231 Rather, this requirement should be constricted to exclude the
sovereign territories of Somalia, since it is highly contestable whether the
TFG regime in Somalia can authorize the use of force inside the sovereign
territorial waters of Somalia. Similarly, TFG consent cannot possibly permit
unlimited enforcement of counter-piracy intervention in the territorial waters
of Somalia.232
Therefore, the definitional requirements of piracy under the LOSC do
not present a considerable set of restraints to the enforcement of counterpiracy laws,233 but rather, greater impediments against suppression of
piracy are fashioned by the jurisdictional concerns that are contingent on
with the existing legal framework.234 Of all the limitations, the feature
that poses the greatest threat to law enforcement is the fact that the UNCLOS
does not require Member States to legislate against piracy as an offense
in accordance with the UNCLOS under their domestic/national laws.235
Similarly, the UNCLOS does not oblige Member States to prosecute or
extradite the pirates apprehended.236 Because of this gap in the counterpiracy legal framework, states routinely release pirates without prosecution
to avoid bearing the costs of the suppression of piracy.237 Ninety percent
of all pirates arrested are released without being prosecuted.238 To counter
this practice, UNSC resolutions such as 1976 of 2011 and 1897 of 2009 have
respectively urged states to bring their domestic laws into conformity with
the UNCLOS to suppress piracy and to prosecute pirates in an effort to enforce
counter-piracy laws effectively.239 This insistence should be accompanied

231. See Hodgkinson, supra note 227, at 66.
232. Justin M. Ndichu, “Plugging a Leak”: A Preliminary Step in Establishing a Nuance
Approach to Govern Intervention in the New Age, 49 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 201, 217, 219–
20 (2016).
233. See Hodgkinson, supra note 227, at 22–30.
234. Churchill, supra note 126, at 29–32.
235. Eric A. Heinze, A “Global War on Piracy?” International Law and the Use of
Force against Sea Pirates, in MARITIME PIRACY & THE CONSTRUCTION OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
52 (Michael J. Struett, Jon D. Carlson, & Mark T. Nance eds., 2013).
236. See id.
237. Wajilda, supra note 163, at 114–15.
238. Elisa Morgera & Kati Kulovesi, The Role of the EU in Promoting International
Standards in the Area of Climate Change, in 8 EU MANAGEMENT OF GLOBAL EMERGENCIES:
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR COMBATING THREATS & CRISES 341 (Ingre Govaere & Sara Poli
eds., 2014).
239. Id. at 342; see also S.C. Res. 1976, supra note 31, ¶ 13; see also S.C. Res. 1897,
supra note 31, ¶ 6.
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by the inclusion of these requirements under the UNCLOS to make law
enforcement more effective.
Furthermore, regardless of the supposition that counter-piracy laws restrict
law enforcement itself, owing to the prevailing loopholes described in this
Article, it cannot be contended that these are the only factors in the global
community’s failure to effectively exterminate piracy. There are obviously
other factors that contribute to the failure in the fight against piracy. For
instance, the cost of locating, apprehending, and prosecuting pirates is said to
be a central feature that prevents states, which are not directly involved,
to fight or suppress piracy.240

240. DAVID A. SADOFF, BRINGING INTERNATIONAL FUGITIVE TO JUSTICE: EXTRADITION &
ITS ALTERNATIVES 227 (2016).
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